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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the recent survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided three cases involving federal and state securities laws. In
Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc. ,I the court found that an "unsophisti-
cated" oil driller had not violated securities laws when he sold and man-
aged working interests in oil leases without registering them or
providing geological data to buyers. Wegerer v. First Commodity Corp. of
Boston,2 a securities fraud which arose out of the sale of copper options,
is notable because the court upheld jurisdiction over share-
holder/directors of the close corporation defendant and found them in-
dividually liable for damages sustained by the defendant investors. The
last case, N. Donald & Co. v. American United Energy Corp.,3 presented the
narrow issue of whether a court may compel arbitration pursuant to an
agreement between broker-dealers. The court held that arbitration
agreements between broker-dealers are not precluded by federal securi-
ties laws and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in compel-
ling arbitration.
I. IGNORANCE IS the Best Defense: COWLES V.
Dow KEITH OIL & GAS, INC.
4
A. Facts
In 1980 and 1981, the plaintiffs, R. S. Cowles and Gloria B. Cowles,
purchased working interests 5 in three oil and gas leases from defendant,
Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc. (Dow Keith Corp.). Investors, including the
Cowles, were not given any geological data on the wells to be drilled
under the three leases.6 Dow Keith Corp. did not register the securities
with either the Oklahoma Securities Commission or the Securities Ex-
change Commission.
7
The Cowles sued Dow Keith Corp. as an issuer of securities, and
1. 752 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. 744 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. 746 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1984).
4. 752 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
5. A working interest, also called an operating interest, is an interest embodying op-
erating rights and/or the right to share in production or revenues from the producing
venture. The receipt of production or revenues will increase as the production of reve-
nues from the producing venture increase, without any termination of such right to receive
production or revenue after the return of the amount of any related advance payment.
Federal Power Commission Order No. 411, 46 F.P.C. 1178, 1180 (1971). A working inter-
est in oil, gas, or mineral leases is a security under the Oklahoma Securities Act, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1984), the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1982), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1982).
6. 752 F.2d at 510. The opinion does not discuss what information, if any, was given
by the defendants to the Cowles.
7. Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 301 (Supp. 1984) provides: "It is unlawful for any person
435
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Dow Keith (Keith) as a "control person" of Dow Keith Corp., alleging
violations of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 9
section 10(b)' 0 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),
and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder," and registration require-
ments of the Oklahoma Securities Act.' 2 The Cowles also raised com-
mon law claims for breach of contract and conversion. The district
court entered judgment for the defendants on all counts.'
3
to offer or sell any security in this state unless (1) it is registered under this act or (2) the
security or transaction is exempted under section 401."
The analogous federal provisions appear in section 5(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e(c) (1982), which states that it is unlawful to offer or sell, in interstate commerce or
through the mails, a security that has not been registered, section 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(1982), which exempts certain securities and transactions from the provisions of the 1933
Act and section 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982), which provides that the provi-
sions of section 5 do not apply to certain exempted securities and transactions.
8. A "control person" is defined as "every person who, by or through stock owner-
ship, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or
understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 .... "15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1982).
9. Section 12(2) is an anti-fraud provision which provides that any person who:
(2) offers or sells a security. . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact . . . and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
11. Under Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person. . . by the use of any means of instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce...
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a mate-
rial fact . . . or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
Courts have implied a private right of action under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
12. Section 408(a) of the Oklahoma Securities Act, which is analogous to section 12 of
the 1933 Act, provides:
(a) Any person who
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 201(a) [anti-fraud
provisions], [section] 301 [broker-dealer registration], or [Section]
404(b) [registration requirements] of this title. . . . or
(2) offers or sells or purchases a security by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact . . . and
who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or
omission, is liable:
(i) in the case of an offer or sale of a security by such means, to
the person buying the security from him . . ..
(ii) in the case of a purchase of a security by such means, to the
person selling the security to him . . ..
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 408(a) (Supp. 1984).
13. 752 F.2d at 510. The district court found that the defendants had proved that (1)
the working interests were exempt from registration; (2) the geological reports were not
material so there was no cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5; (3) there was no breach of the
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B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing for the majority, affirmed
the district court's decision. After a surprisingly long discussion of the
appropriate standard of appellate review, 14 Judge Barrett focused on
the alleged violation of the Oklahoma Securities Act. 15 At trial, the de-
fendants had asserted, as an affirmative defense to the claim of lack of
registration, that they had complied with the requirements set forth in
section 401(b) (15) of the Oklahoma Securities Act, and were, therefore,
entitled to exemption from registration. 16 On appeal, the Cowles al-
leged that the defendants had not satisfied the elements of that exemp-
tion because they had not proved: (1) that Dow Keith reasonably
believed all buyers were purchasing for investment purposes,1 7 (2) that
no commission or other renumeration had been paid in connection with
the sale, 18 or (3) that Dow Keith reasonably believed that the buyers
were capable of bearing the economic risk and evaluating the business
risk of the prospective investment. 19 The majority opinion suggested
that because the Cowles and other investors had contacted Dow Keith
"seeking to invest," the first requirement was met: the defendants rea-
sonably could have believed that all buyers were purchasing for invest-
ment.20 Next, the court held that although drilling and completion
costs were excessive, the overcharges were "inadvertant and uninten-
tional," were corrected when discovered and, therefore, did not consti-
operating agreement; (4) since the defendants had disclosed all they knew to the plaintiffs,
there was no common law fraud; and (5) because there was neither intent nor damages,
the conversion claim failed. Id. at 512-13.
14. 752 F.2d at 510-11.
15. Id. at 511-12; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. Section 401(b)(15) of the Oklahoma Securities Act provides an exemption for a
transaction meeting the following requirements:
A. Any sale from or in this state to not more than thirty-two persons of a
unit consisting of interests in oil, gas or mining titles or leases or any certificate of
interest or participation, or conveyance in any form of an interest therein, or in
payments out of production pursuant to such titles or leases, whether or not of-
fered in conjunction with, or as an incident to, an operating agreement or other
contract to drill oil or gas wells or otherwise exploit the minerals on the particular
leases, whether or not the seller or any purchasers are then present in the state, if:
1. the seller reasonably believes that all buyers are purchasing for
investment;
2. no commission is paid or given directly or indirectly for the solicita-
tion of any such sale excluding any commission paid or given by and
between parties each of whom is engaged in the business of exploring
for or producing oil and gas or other valuable minerals;
3. no public advertising or public solicitation is used in any such solici-
tations or sale; and
4. sales are effected only to persons the seller has reasonable cause to
believe are capable of evaluating the risk of the prospective investment
and able to bear the economic risk of the investment;
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15) (Supp. 1984).
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A)(l) (Supp. 1984). See supra note 16.
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A)(2). See supra note 16.
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 401(b)(15)(A)(4). See supra note 16.
20. 752 F.2d at 511-12.
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tute disguised commissions. Since no commissions had been paid to the
defendants, the second element of the exemption was established.
2 1
The court stated that it had several reasons for believing that Keith had
met the third requirement of the exemption; that is, that Keith reason-
ably believed that the investors were able to evaluate and financially bear
the risks of the investment. The fact that the Cowles sought out Keith
wanting to invest, the fact that the Cowles had discussed the investment
with an individual (Mr. Cowles' dentist) who had already invested with
Keith, and the fact that Keith knew that the Cowles were paying for the
investment in cash, together showed that Keith had reason to believe the
Cowles could evaluate and financially bear the investment risks.
2 2
The majority also found that the defendants had not violated the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act because there was no public
offering.23 The opinion relied on the district court's findings: (1) that
the Cowles were not approached by Keith but rather had themselves
initiated the investment transaction, and (2) that the operation was such
a small one, involving only shallow wells, that the Cowles "had about as
much means of acquiring information and knowledge as did the defend-
ant." The court held, therefore, that the defendants had no duty to reg-
ister under federal law.
2 4
Furthermore, the court held that the defendants had not violated
the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act by failing to provide investors
with geological or similar data, because such data is not "material" in-
formation in the context of minor drilling operations involving only
shallow wells.
25
2. Judge McKay's Dissent
Judge McKay argued in dissent that the defendants had not proved
that each investor was capable of evaluating the risks of the investment
and, consequently, the defendants could not use the section
401(b)(15)(A)(4) exemption as an affirmative defense.2 6 Judge McKay
offered two reasons for his conclusion. First, the majority relied on
Keith's testimony to establish that the third requirement of the exemp-
tion had been met. Judge McKay reasoned that to allow a claimant to
establish an exemption based solely on his own testimony would under-
21. Id. at 5.12 (citing the District Court's Finding of Facts #2 1).
22. Id. at 511-12.
23. Id. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides that a transaction by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering is exempt from the registration requirements set forth in sec-
tion 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). The court's discussion appears to be directed toward a
section 12(1) violation (offer or sale of a security in violation of the registration require-
ments set forth in section 5). 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). The Cowles claimed the defendants
had violated section 12(2) which imposes liability on both public offerings and exempt
transactions of securities (with one exception not relevant here). Thus, registration is ir-
relevant to a section 12(2) violation. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATIONS 1016, 1019-27 (1983).
24. 752 F.2d at 512.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 514 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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mine the registration provisions of the Oklahoma Securities Act.2 7 Sec-
ond, Judge McKay argued that the defendants' proof of the Cowles
sophistication fell short of the standard established in Oklahoma case
law, 28 noting that Keith had not even spoken to some of the investors.
29
Judge McKay also maintained that the majority had focused on the
wrong party in determining whether the defendants were exempt from
state and federal registration laws. The majority focused upon the
seller's lack of sophistication, when, according to Judge McKay, the in-
vestor's lack of sophistication is the relevant criterion in determining
whether the exemption requirements have been met.
3 0
C. Analysis
The Cowles decision establishes a dangerous precedent: a seller's lack
of sophistication may be a defense to claims that the seller has violated
registration requirements. This reasoning places Cowles at odds with
Oklahoma case law, under which the defendant has the burden of prov-
ing each element of the exemption, including the sophistication of each
investor.3 ' Moreover, an analysis of decisions under securities regula-
tion statutes suggests that the Cowles decision is also at odds with the
underlying purpose of the general regulatory scheme of such statutes.
The requirements set forth in exemption section 401(b)(15) of the
Oklahoma Securities Act 32 are similar to the requirements of a Rule 506
exemption under the 1933 Act.33 Rule 506, promulgated under Regula-
tion D, is a safe harbor;3 4 compliance with its requirements assures an
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Parrish v. Ben-Jon Oil Co., 666 P.2d 1308 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (inves-
tor's initial on prospectus was not sufficient to prove investor was able to evaluate risks
and bear economic risk of investment) and Lambrecht v. Bartlett, 656 P.2d 269 (Okla.
1982) (defendant failed to prove that all investors were sophisticated)).
29. 752 F.2d at 514 (McKay, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 16.
33. Rule 506 provides:
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the condi-
tions in paragraph (b) of this Rule 506 shall be deemed to be transactions not
involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act.
(b) Conditions to Be Met
(1) General Conditions. To qualify for exemption under this Rule 506, offers
and sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of Rules 501 through 503.
(2) Specific Conditions
(i) Limitation on Number of Purchasers. The issuer shall reasonably believe that
there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any
offering under this Rule 506 ...
(ii) Nature of Purchasers. The issuer shall reasonably believe immediately
prior to making any sale that each purchaser who is not an accredited
investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1984).
34. SEC Act Release No. 6389, 24 S.E.C. Dock. 1444, 1451 n.33 (1982). For a history
of the development of Regulation D, see Stem, Potential Liability of Purchaser Representatives,
39 Bus. LAw. 1801 (1984).
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issuer of a 4(2) exemption from registration.3 5 In light of judicial deci-
sions addressing the 4(2) exemption, the Cowles holding appears
discordant.
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,36 for instance, the Supreme Court
stated that an offering to investors "able to fend for themselves" is a
transaction "not involving any public offering."'3 7 The Supreme Court
also stated that because the purpose of the 1933 Act was to protect in-
vestors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions, the exemption question turned on the
knowledge of the offerees.3 8 The Court held that in determining
whether securities are exempt from registration, one must ask whether
the offeree needs the protection which registration affords, as evidenced
by whether the offerees have access to the kind of information that regis-
tration would disclose.
39
In Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court implied,40 and federal courts
of appeal have widely held,4 1 that sophistication is not a substitute for
access to the type of information a registration statement would dis-
close. Indeed, in G. Eugene England Foundation v. First Federal Corp. ,42 a
Tenth Circuit decision, the court indicated that the investor's sophistica-
tion, without more, was not enough to satisfy exemption requirements
under Rule 506. In that case, the buyer of an unregistered security
sought rescission of an exchange agreement in which the buyer received
shares of stock in an oil company. The defendant asserted that the ex-
change transaction was exempt from registration because the transac-
tion was not a public offering. 43 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's finding that rescission should be granted; although the founder
and president of the plaintiff-corporation had prior business transac-
tions with the company issuing the unregistered security, there was no
35. SEC Act Release No. 6389, 24 S.E.C. Dock. 1166, 1178 n.33 (1982).
36. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
37. Id. at 125.
38. Id. at 124, 126-27.
39. Id. at 127. Courts have distilled the Ralston Purina holding into a two-part test: (1)
whether the offerees need the protection registration affords, and (2) whether the offerees
have access to the kind of information registration would disclose. See, e.g., Mason v. Mar-
shall, 412 F. Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976).
40. 346 U.S. at 125. The Court said that an offering might be exempt if made to
executive personnel "who because of their position have access to the same kind of infor-
mation that the [1933 Act] would make available in the form of a registration statement."
41. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir.
1977) (setting forth four factors bearing upon whether an exemption is warranted: the
number of offenses and their relationship to each other and to the issuer (held to include
the knowledge of the offenses), the number of units offered, the size of the offering, and
the manner of the offering); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 373-74 (10th Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that exemption may not be based solely upon the sophistication of the offeree, without
regard to his actual knowledge concerning the issuer); Hill York Corp. v. American Inter-
national Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 687-89 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussing the same four
factors set forth in Doran); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678
(4th Cir.) (stating specifically that sophistication is not a substitute for access to the kind of
information which registration would disclose), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
42. 663 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1973) (cited in Cowles. 752 F.2d at 512).
43. 663 F.2d at 990.
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evidence of what knowledge he possessed concerning either the stock or
the company, nor was he shown to be in a position to know such infor-
mation as would have been disclosed by registration. 4 4 In apparent op-
position to these cases, however, the majority in Cowles implied that the
Dow Keith Corp. offering was exempt from registration because the
plaintiffs were no less sophisticated than Keith, having "about as much
means of acquiring information and knowledge as did the defendant."
Thus, the court replaces the "access to information" criterion of Ralston
Purina with one of its own; under Cowles it seems that a seller need not
prove that the buyer of securities had access to appropriate information
as long as the seller can prove that the seller did not have appropriate
information to disclose to the buyer!
A recent case decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is further
evidence that the Cowles decision misapplied the requirements of the sec-
tion 401(b)(15) exemption. In PIC Oil Company, Inc. v. Grisham,4 5 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed a registration exemption provision
in the Oklahoma Securities Act which states that transactions involving
limited partnership interests in oil ventures, when both the buyer and
seller are in the oil business, are exempt transactions and are therefore
not subject to the securities laws.4 6 The rationale offered for this ex-
emption was that experienced buyers and sellers do not need the protec-
tion of the securities laws. If, on the other hand, an experienced buyer
was dealing with a novice seller, the experienced buyer would be pro-
tected because the novice seller would be required to disclose his lack of
experience. According to the court, the Oklahoma legislature had de-
sired to afford this protection to both inexperienced and experienced
buyers.
4 7
If Keith and Dow Keith Corp. were indeed the unsophisticates per-
ceived by the majority in Cowles, then a correct application of the
401(b)(15) exemption requirements, in light of the legislative policies
expressed in PIC Oil, would have afforded the Cowles the protection the
Oklahoma legislature had hoped to provide because Keith would have
been forced to disclose his lack of experience through registration.
D. Conclusion
The Cowles decision appears to run contrary to the letter and the
spirit of both state and federal securities regulations. However, the
Cowles court emphasized the fact that the case involved a minor opera-
tion of very shallow wells, and that the buyers sought out the seller of
the securities at issue in the case. The court noted that for these rea-
sons, Cowles was not a "typical securities fraud case."' 48 Thus, the prece-
dential value of Cowles may be minimal if (1) the holding is applied only
44. Id.
45. 702 P.2d 28 (Okla. 1985).
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 2(20)(R) (Supp. 1984).
47. 702 P.2d at 31 &n. 1l.
48. Cowles, 752 F.2d at 511-12.
1986]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
within similar minor drilling operations or (2) the holding is applied
only to the narrow confines of disputes arising under the Oklahoma
401(b) (15) exemption.
II. INDIVIDUAL LIABILrY OF SHAREHOLDER/DIRECTORS IN SECURITIES
FRAUD ACTIONS: WEGERER V. FIRST COMMODITY
CORP. OF BOSTON 49
A. Facts
In April of 1978, Louis and Judith Wegerer responded to a newspa-
per advertisement placed by the defendant, First Commodity Corpora-
tion of Boston (FCCB). A few days later, the Wegerers received the first
of numerous telephone calls from Robert Jones, an account executive
for FCCB. These calls continued until May of 1978, when Jones con-
vinced the Wegerers to purchase two copper commodity options con-
tracts. Two days after the sale of the second options contract, the sale of
commodity options was temporarily halted by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. Within a short period of time, the Wegerers' cop-
per contracts were worthless.
50
The Wegerers subsequently sued FCCB, Jones, 51 and Richard and
Donald Schleicher, brothers who were the principal officers and sole di-
rectors of FCCB, and who at the time owned 100% of FCCB. The
Wegerers alleged that the defendants had fraudulently induced them to
purchase the copper contracts in violation of federal securities law. The
Wegerers also raised claims of fraud and conspiracy to defraud under
Kansas law.
5 2
The trial court awarded the Wegerers $15,000 in actual damages
and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Following a motion for remittitur,
the trial court reduced the ward to $10,775 in actual damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages. 53 The defendants appealed, raising
eight allegations of error.
5 4
49. 744 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 721-22. The defendants presented no evidence at trial; all facts were sup-
plied by the plaintiffs.
51. Because Robert Jones was never served, he was not a party to the suit. Id. at 720
n.l.
52. Id. at 722.
53. Id.
54. Id. The defendants alleged that the district court erred by: (1) refusing to give
their requested instruction on justifiable reliance; (2) refusing to grant a new trial after
finding that the $1,000,000 punitive damage award was excessive; (3) denying their mo-
tions for directed verdict and a new trial; (4) submitting instructions on conspiracy and on
corporate officers, directors and employees as co-conspirators, since officers, directors or
employees of a corporation acting in their official capacity on behalf of a corporation can-
not conspire with their corporation; (5) holding that it had personal jurisdiction over the
Schleichers; (6) admitting a consent decree signed by the Schleichers and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission in 1976 into evidence; (7) admitting the testimony of two
FCCB customers; and (8) ruling that various complaints filed with the Commodity Futures




B. The Majority Opinion
Judge Barrett, writing for the majority, discussed four of the eight
issues raised by the defendants: 55 (1) the trial judge's rejection of the
defendants' proffered jury instructions on justifiable reliance; (2) the ad-
mission into evidence of a consent decree executed by the Schleichers;
(3) whether the individual defendants could be held liable under either a
conspiracy charge or an alter ego theory; and (4) the trial court's finding
of personal jurisdiction over the Schleichers.
The defendants' first two contentions were dismissed by the court
after brief discussion and were not particularly significant issues in the
opinion. First, the court upheld the trial court's instruction on justifi-
able reliance, stating that the instruction given regarding the defend-
ants' theory of the case need not be framed in the specific language
selected by the defendants. 56 The court then held that a "consent de-
cree" 5 7 executed in 1976 by FCCB and the Schleichers was properly
admitted into evidence.
5 8
The court's discussion of the defendants' third and fourth conten-
tions proved more controversial. 59 After disposing of the first two is-
sues, the court turned its attention to the defendants' argument that the
district court erred in instructing the jury on conspiracy.60 The defend-
ants argued that under May v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. ,61 an of-
ficer, director or employee of a corporation, acting in an official capacity
on behalf of the corporation, cannot conspire with the corporation. The
majority, acknowledging that May set forth the general rule, stated that
May also implicitly recognized an exception: an officer, director, or em-
ployee who personally benefits from the illegal activities in a way which
is separate and distinct from that of the corporation may be held to be a
participant in a conspiracy with the corporation. 62 The majority placed
primary importance on the fact that the Schleichers had signed the 1976
consent decree in their individual capacities, indicating that the
55. Id. at 722-28. The remaining allegations of error were summarily held to be with-
out merit. Id. at 728.
56. 744 F.2d at 723.
57. A "consent decree" is a settlement agreement whereby a defendant agrees to
cease activities which a government agency asserts are illegal. A consent decree has no
precedential value. See generally A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COM-
MoDrrIEs FRAUD § 1.3, at 329 (1984).
58. 744 F.2d at 724 (citing United States v. Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715. 719 (10th Cir.
1980) (in which a criminal indictment was admissible to show intent and knowledge) and
Kerr v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 735 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1984) (wherein the 1976
consent decree was admitted for the limited purpose of proving FCCB's knowledge and
intent to defraud but only insofar as the consent decree was relevant to the issue of puni-
tive damages)). Contra Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893-94 (2d
Cir. 1976) (consent decree and references to SEC complaint are not admissible).
59. In fact, Judge McKay's dissent focussed exclusively on these two issues. See infra
text accompanying notes 68-80.
60. 744 F.2d at 724.
61. 189 Kan. 419, 370 P.2d 390 (1962).
62. 744 F.2d at 725. As the Tenth Circuit noted, the exception is set forth in Green-
ville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974) and Jewel
Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida, 497 F. Supp. 513, 518 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
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Schleichers and FCCB had acted separately. Additionally, the court de-
termined from the record that there had been three incidents of per-
sonal gain. First, because FCCB's earnings had flourished, the
Schleichers had made a large profit on a sale of FCCB stock. Second,
the Schleichers had sold several FCCB sales offices, the proceeds of
which went directly to the Schleichers. Third, FCCB had loaned money
to the Schleichers at six percent interest with favorable repayment
terms. The majority held that these circumstances showed that the
Schleichers had derived a personal benefit from the fraudulent sale of
commodity options, thus bringing them within the exception implicitly
recognized in May.
63
Alternatively, the majority stated that even if the Schleichers had
not received a personal benefit, the facts supported application of the
alter ego doctrine to find individual liability of the defendants. 64 Under
that doctrine, FCCB's existence as a corporate entity would be disre-
garded; the Schleichers' reliance on the May rule would be inappropri-
ate because the torts of employee Jones, imputed to FCCB, would be
imputed to the Schleichers.
65
The final allegation of error discussed by the majority involved the
trial court's finding of personal jurisdiction over the Schleichers.
Although the majority acknowledged that jurisdiction over individual of-
ficers may not be obtained by acquiring jurisdiction over the corpora-
tion,6 6 the majority held that the jurisdictional requirement was met
because the plaintiffs had presented a prima facie case of conspiracy,
thus allowing jurisdiction under the Kansas long-arm statute.
6 7
C. Judge McKay's Separate Opinion
Judge McKay concurred in part, but dissented from the majority
opinion on the issues of conspiracy and personal jurisdiction. 68 Much of
Judge McKay's dissent was devoted to a discussion of the "personal
gain" exception. Judge McKay first challenged the majority's reliance
on the fact that the consent decree was executed by the defendants indi-
63. 744 F.2d at 726.
64. The alter ego doctrine fastens liability on the individual who uses a corporation
merely as an instrumentality to conduct his or her personal business, and such liability
arises from fraud or injustice perpetrated on persons dealing with the corporation. The
corporate form may be disregarded only where equity so requires. 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (perm. ed. 1983).
65. 744 F.2d at 726-27.
66. Id. at 727 (citing Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 901 (1st
Cir. 1980) and Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969)).
67. 744 F.2d at 727. The Kansas long-arm statute provides:
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent or instrumentality does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated
thereby submits the person . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to
any cause of action arising from the doing of these acts:
(2) commission of a tortious act within this state;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(2) (1980).
68. 744 F.2d at 728-30 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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vidually. He argued that the individual execution of the consent decree
was insufficient to establish that the Schleichers were acting outside of
their official capacities. 6 9 Next, Judge McKay cited authority which sug-
gests that the mere ownership or sale of stock does not constitute the
type of personal gain necessary to vitiate the general rule that a corpora-
tion cannot conspire with its officers. 70 With respect to the profits re-
ceived by the defendants from sales of regional offices, Judge McKay
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the record.7 1 Judge Mc-
Kay stated that the trial court record was ambiguous and could have
been interpreted to mean that the defendants were to receive the profits
as a result of their stock ownership and not directly from the purchasing
parties. 7 2 Finally, Judge McKay stated that the low-interest loans made
by FCCB to the Schleichers did not show that the individual defendants
acted outside their official capacities for personal gain in connection
with the transactions at issue in the suit.
7 3
Judge McKay concluded that the evidence relied upon by the major-
ity constituted regular incidents of an officer-corporation relationship
and did not establish a personal gain sufficient to invoke the "personal
gain" exception to the May rule. 7 4 Judge McKay stated that under the
majority's analysis, the exception would swallow the rule because many
common methods of remuneration would fall under the "personal gain"
exception. 75 Therefore, under Judge McKay's analysis, only the corpo-
ration (through its employee Jones) could be said to have defrauded the
Wegerers. Hence, since conspiracy requires the participation of at least
two actors, no conspiracy occurred in this case.
Judge McKay next addressed the majority's application of the alter
ego doctrine, stating that the case at bar was easily distinguishable from
alter ego cases previously decided in Kansas. 76 In contrast to the under-
capitalized, one-man corporations described in Kansas case law, 77 FCCB
69. Id. at 728.
70. Id. (citingJewel Foliage Co., 497 F. Supp. 513) (interest arising from majority own-
ership is not separate and distinct benefit) and Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 7 Kan.
App. 2d 416, 643 P.2d 1115 (1982) (whether defendants would benefit derivatively was
immaterial because all acts complained of by plaintiff were totally related to official corpo-
rate responsibilities)).
71. The portion of the record in question was extracted from one defendant's deposi-
tion:
QUESTION: So within three to four years you expect to realize six million dollars
from the sale of these offices?
ANSWER: Correct.
QUESTION: Where will the proceeds of that sale go?
ANSWER: Proceeds of the sale will go to myself and my brother.






77. See Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 665 P.2d 743, 751-52 (1983) (citing Kirk v.
H.G.P. Corp. Inc., 208 Kan. 777, 494 P.2d 1087 (1972) (wherein the court, applying the
alter ego doctrine, imposed personal liability on the principal stockholder who was also
the officer, manager, principal creditor and principal employee of the corporation) and
1986]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
was a national operation with several hundred employees. 78 Further-
more, Judge McKay argued that the alter ego doctrine applies only when
the plaintiff would suffer an injustice by the court's acknowledgement of
the corporate entity. Judge McKay found no indications that the Weger-
ers would be unable to recover a judgment from the corporation in this
case, and there was therefore no indication that they would suffer injus-
tice by recognition of the corporation's existence.
7 9
Judge McKay concluded that because the Wegerers had failed to
establish either a conspiracy or the applicability of the alter ego doc-
trine, no tort had been committed in Kansas by the individual defend-
ants. Consequently, there was no basis for jurisdiction under the Kansas
long-arm statute.8 0
D. Analysis
The major point of contention between the majority and the dissent
was whether the individual defendants, Richard and Donald Schleicher,
had received personal gains sufficient to bring them within the excep-
tion to the May rule. A survey of case law in other jurisdictions leads to
the conclusion that the majority may have misapplied the appropriate
standards.
The first application of the "personal gain" exception, also known
as the "independent stake exception," appeared in Greenville Publishing
Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc. 81 In Greenville, the plaintiff alleged that an indi-
vidual defendant had conspired with a corporation (a newspaper in
which the defendant was president, director and stockholder) to sup-
press competition for newspaper advertisers in violation of anti-trust
laws.8 2 The individual defendant also had received a percentage of ad-
vertising revenues from a second newspaper with which he was affili-
ated. 8 3 The court held that for the purposes of summary judgment, it
was reasonable to infer that the defendant would personally benefit
from his affiliation with the second newspaper by the elimination of
competition. Because the individual defendant had an independent
stake in suppressing the competition, the conspiracy claim was permit-
ted to stand.
8 4
Successful invocations of the "independent stake exception" have
been rare.8 5 In Jewel Foliage Co. v. Uniflora Overseas Florida,8 6 the plaintiff
Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v. Poynter, 205 Kan. 787, 473 P.2d 33 (1970) (wherein the court
disregarded successive corporations when defendant disregarded corporate formalities
and entities were severely undercapitalized)).
78. 744 F.2d at 730 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 399.
83. Id. at 399-400.
84. Id.
85. For examples of successful use of the exception, see Coleman Motor Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (individual employee-managers owning
dealerships could conspire with car manufacturer); Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424 (3d
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corporation attempted to hold a principal stockholder liable for the de-
fendant corporations' "dumping" of Guatemalan foliage on the Ameri-
can market, allegedly in violation of the Anti-Dumping Act.8 7 Because
the plaintiff had not alleged that the individual defendant had an interest
in suppressing competition, other than his majority ownership of stock
in the defendant corporations, the Greenville exception did not apply.
8 8
The court held that an interest arising out of stock ownership "is not the
type of separate and distinct stake to which the exception is directed."8
9
A Fifth Circuit decision reflects Judge McKay's concern that hold-
ings such as that in Wegerer may cause the general rule to be swallowed
by the exception.9 0 In H & B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 9 ' the plaintiff argued that the defendants, International Harvester
and the manager of an International Harvester distributorship, had con-
spired illegally to restrain trade. The plaintiff asserted that because the
manager had the opportunity to purchase an ownership interest in a dis-
tributorship if he "did a good job," the manager had a personal stake in
the alleged illegal trade restraints.9 2 The court pointed out that any
benefit the manager might have received was indistinguishable from
other forms of compensation, such as salary.9 3 Also, there was no eco-
nomic entity, other than the corporation, involved in the case. Thus,
"[w]ithout such an organization legally distinct from [International Har-
vester], it would be impossible for an employee to have an interest that
was truly 'independent.' ,,94
A similar situation was presented to the Tenth Circuit in Holter v.
Moore.9 5 The court in Holter held that a real estate agent could not con-
spire with a broker-employer for anti-trust purposes, absent invocation
of the "independent personal stake" doctrine.9 6 In a footnote, the court
delineated the parameters of the "independent personal stake" doc-
trine: "[It] applies only when the officer has an outside economic inter-
est, such as ownership of a competing corporation, through which he
will benefit from the restraint."
'9 7
Two recent decisions addressing conspiracy to violate anti-trust
laws strongly suggest that the majority misapplied the "independent
personal stake" exception. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Cir. 1971) (individual who was president of hotel corporation had conspired with third
parties in an effort to force hotel tenant to abandon premises).
86. 497 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
87. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976), repealed by Pub. L No. 96-39. § 106(a). 93 Stat. 193
(1979) (effective January 1, 1980).
88. 497 F. Supp. at 518.
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying note 75.
91. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 244.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 702 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983). This opinion was writ-
ten by Judge McKay. Judges Holloway and Logan joined in the opinion.
96. Id. at 857.
97. Id. at 857 n.8.
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Corp. ,98 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a corpo-
ration and its wholly-owned subsidiary could conspire to restrain trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.9 9 The Court held that the two entities
were incapable of conspiracy inasmuch as the "officers of a single firm
are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic
interests."l 0 0
The second anti-trust case was decided by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia after the Copperweld decision was
handed down. In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,' 0 ' the
plaintiffs contended that the Atlas Van Lines board of directors and the
defendant corporation had conspired to promulgate a policy which re-
sulted in an illegal restraint of trade. 10 2 The court held that while the
new policy might well result in the accrual of distinct benefits to the
directors, there was no conspiracy because the plaintiffs had failed to
prove facts sufficient to invoke the independent stake exception. '0 3 The
court carefully distinguished the Greenville case, upon which the Wegerer
majority relied, by pointing out that the "independent personal stake"
in Greenville resulted from an interest that was completely unrelated,
wholly divergent and possibly inconsistent with the individual defend-
ant's corporate ownership. ' 0 4 This was in stark contrast to Rothery Stor-
age, where the personal benefits alleged were "wholly consistent" with
the interest of Atlas and its agents. The court in Rothery Storage pointed
out that a stockholder/director of a company "does not hold an imper-
missible personal benefit or act 'on his own behalf simply because his
effort to advance the interests of the corporation would increase the
value of his stock interest and the dividends paid to him."' 1 5 Such ad-
vantages, the court determined, are merely incidental to the advantage
to the corporation.1
0 6
In light of these cases, it appears that the Wegerer majority molded
the "independent stake" exception to render the Schleichers personally
liable to the Wegerers. Although the Schleichers may have received
benefits from the alleged conspiracy, those benefits were not unrelated,
divergent or inconsistent with their corporate ownership. In short, the
benefits received were not independent of FCCB, but arose through the
Schleichers' ownership of FCCB stock. And, as the dissent suggests, a
finding of personal liability was not necessary to effectuate recovery for
the Wegerers because there was no suggestion that FCCB would not be
able to satisfy the judgment against it.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Schleichers did receive a personal ben-
98. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
99. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated section 2 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2741.




105. Id. at 228-29.
106. Id. at 229.
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efit and therefore were capable of conspiring with FCCB, there is case
law which suggests that a finding of personal jurisdiction over an absent
conspirator cannot be achieved by a rote application of the applicable
long-arm statute. The "conspiracy theory of jurisdiction" is summa-
rized in a recent Delaware Supreme Court case:
First, the acts of each co-conspirator are attributable to
each of the other co-conspirators. Therefore, any act by a con-
spirator in furtherance of the conspiracy which takes place in
the jurisdiction is attributable to the other conspirators. Con-
sequently, if the purposeful act or acts of a conspirator are of a
nature and quality that would subject the actor to the juisdic-
tion of the court, all of the conspirators are subject to the juris-
diction of the court.'
0 7
At present, there is a split of authority as to whether participation in
a conspiracy will give rise to jurisdiction over the absent conspirator.10 8
The jurisdictions which accept the theory apply various tests to deter-
mine whether a state's exercise ofjurisdiction is proper. The tests range
from requiring an allegation of conspiracy coupled with an act or event
in the forum state' 0 9 to the requirement that a defendant make a prima
facie factual showing that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant
was a member of the conspiracy; (3) there was a connection between the
defendant and the transaction in the forum state; (4) the defendant was
aware of the effect of the transaction in the forum state; (5) the defend-
ant derived some benefit from the activity; and (6) the absent conspira-
tor exercised direction and control over the in-state conspirator. 1 10
E. Conclusion
The Wegerer majority contorted the "independent personal stake"
exception to find that the Schleichers were conspirators. Then, without
benefit of discussion or analysis, the court apparently adopted the most
lenient approach to the conspiracy theory ofjurisdiction. As the dissent
pointed out, there was no suggestion that the plaintiffs could not re-
cover from FCCB. The majority opinion adds yet another unnecessary
tentacle to the far-reaching doctrine of conspiracy.
107. Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 222 (Del. Super. Ct.
1982). This case surveys the decisions addressing the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction.
108. Id. The conspiracy theory of jurisdiction has been rejected in I.S. Joseph Co., Inc.
v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Co., 508 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Minn. 1980) and Kipperman v.
McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
The courts accepting the conspiracy theory ofjurisdiction include Williams v. Garcia,
569 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (dicta); Dixon v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Gemini Enterprises v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559 (M.D.N.C. 1979);
Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973); Maricopa County v. American
Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The Sixth Circuit has neither adopted nor rejected the theory. Chrysler Corp. v. Fed-
ders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
109. See Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467, 468-69 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
110. Dixon v. Mack. 507 F. Supp. 345, 348-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
1986]
DENVER UNIVERSITY IL W REVIEW
III. MANDATORY ARBITRATION AMONG BROKER-DEALERS: N. DONALD &
Co. v AMERICAN UNITED ENERGY CORP."'
The plaintiffs in N. Donald Co. were two broker-dealers who had
purchased stock issued by defendant American United Energy Corpora-
tion (American United). The plaintiffs filed suit against American
United, three broker-dealer companies, and others 1 2 alleging that the
defendants were engaged in an illegal scheme to sell stock in the public
market at a fraudulently inflated price." 1
3
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions violated several
federal and state securities" 14 and anti-racketeering laws," 5 and consti-
tuted common law fraud. 1 6 The three broker-dealer defendants asked
the district court to stay judicial proceedings and compel arbitration be-
tween themselves and the plaintiffs pursuant to the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), of which the plaintiffs and the
three concerned defendants were members. 1 7 The district court
granted the request and abated the suit pending the outcome of arbitra-
tion proceedings. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to stay
arbitration and the plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The sole issue on
appeal was whether the district court had committed reversible error in
staying the judicial proceedings pending completion of arbitration." 18
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rul-
ing on two grounds. First, the court concluded that arbitration agree-
ments between members of a self-regulatory agency are valid and are
not precluded by the non-waiver provisions of the federal securities
laws." 9 Second, the court held that the trial court had discretion to
determine whether arbitrable claims were so intertwined with non-arbi-
trable claims 120 that resolution of all claims must take place in the judi-
111. 746 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1984).
112. The broker-dealer defendants were Edward Brown Securities, Inc., Western Capi-
tal & Securities, Inc., and Rooney, Pace Corp. Several officers and directors of American
United, along with American United's auditors, were also named as defendants.
113. 746 F.2d at 668.
114. Id. The plaintiffs alleged violations of: (1) section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) and Rule lOb-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984); (2) sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(1) and 771(2) (1982); and (3) the Colorado
Securities Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (Supp. 1984).
115. 746 F.2d at 668. The anti-racketeering acts allegedly violated were (1) the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982),
and (2) the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-101 (Supp.
1984).
116. 746 F.2d at 668.
117. The plaintiffs and the broker-dealer defendants were members of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). As members of NASD, the plaintiffs had agreed
before this dispute arose to arbitrate disputes with other broker-dealer members of NASD.
Id. at 669.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 670. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text on the issue of arbitra-
tion agreements among members of self-regulated organizations.
120. The non-arbitrable claims were those claims made against other defendants in the




On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement at
issue was invalid for several reasons. First, the plaintiffs asserted that an
arbitration agreement is void when it operates to deprive the federal
court of its exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities law claims. 12 2
The plaintiffs also contended that arbitration agreements are void if they
deprive plaintiffs of a judicial forum in cases involving alleged securities
laws violations. The plaintiffs argued that this conclusion was mandated
by Wilko v. Swan 123 and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 124
cases in which arbitration agreements made incident to securities
purchases were held invalid as violations of federal securities laws. The
plaintiffs further argued that Colorado law required the court to void the
arbitration agreement with respect to claims alleging violations of the
state securities act.
12 5
The court did not address the plaintiffs' claims regarding exclusive
jurisdiction and Colorado law. Nor did the court engage in any substan-
tive discussion of Wilko. 12 6 The court did briefly examine portions of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)12 7 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 128 concluding that broker-dealers do not
enjoy the non-waiver protections afforded to the individual purchaser of
shares of stock. 129 The court then distinguished Moore on the ground
that its holding related to a customer-broker arbitration agreement,
rather than to mutual members of NASD. The court determined that
the law "appears to be" that arbitration agreements between NASD
members are valid and enforceable and are not precluded by either the
1933 Act or the 1934 Act.1
3 0
The court acknowledged two exceptions to the rule that arbitration
121. Id. at 671.
122. Id. at 669. The 1934 Act provides that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over claims arising under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). The 1933 Act grants concur-
rent jurisdiction to federal and state courts. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
123. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Wilko decision held that under section 14 of the 1933
Act, which declared void any binding stipulation to waive compliance with any provision of
the 1933 Act, an arbitration agreement requiring a plaintiff to arbitrate section 12(2)
claims was void.
124. 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978) (arbitration agreement requiring customer to arbi-
trate 1933 Act and 1934 Act claims is void).
125. 746 F.2d at 669 (citing Sandefer v. Reynolds Securities Inc., 44 Colo. App. 343,
618 P.2d 690 (1980) (in which the Colorado Court of Appeals, applying Wilko, held that an
agreement requiring arbitration of a Colorado Securities Act claim is void)). Sandefer was
subsequently overruled by Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985). See infra
note 139.
126. The court noted merely that the "Supreme Court has spoken generally on this
question . . . in Wilko .... " 746 F.2d at 670.
127. See supra note 114.
128. See supra note 114.
129. 746 F.2d at 670. Section 28(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982), pro-
vides that nothing in the 1934 Act shall be construed to modify existing law with regard to
the binding effect on self-regulatory organizations to settle disputes between members and
participants. This section has been recognized as creating an exception to the Wilko doc-
trine. See, e.g., De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1981);
Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 773-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
130. 746 F.2d at 670.
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agreements between NASD members are enforceable. 13 1 Under the
first exception, when a broker is fraudulently induced to become a
NASD member, the arbitration agreement contained in the NASD rules
and regulations is not binding. The plaintiffs' pleadings did not bring
them within this exception.1
3 2
Under the second exception, set forth in Allegaert v. Perot,133 a Sec-
ond Circuit case, when there is a "wholesale fraud of institutional
dimensions," 134 the public has an overriding interest in judicial resolu-
tion and arbitration agreements will not be enforced. The Tenth Circuit
refused to apply this exception, distinguishing the Second Circuit case
and finding that the plaintiffs' evidence had not established "wholesale
fraud of institutional dimensions."
13 5
Finally, the plaintiffs contended in the alternative that even if the
arbitration agreement was valid, the arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims
were so intertwined that arbitration should be denied or stayed in order
to preserve the district court's jurisdiction over the non-arbitrable
claims. 13 6 The court gave this argument little consideration, stating that
"the trial court has discretion whether to stay arbitration pending ajudi-
cial resolution of non-arbitrable claims."'
13 7
Five months after N. Donald Co. was decided, the Supreme Court
handed down Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 13 8 The Supreme Court's
holding in Byrd may bear significantly upon the precedential value of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in N. Donald Co.'
39
The plaintiff in Byrd, a private investor, had signed a customer's
agreement with defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., which provided
that "[a]ny controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of
or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbi-
tration."' 40 When the plaintiffs account declined in value, he filed suit
alleging various federal and state law violations. Dean Witter moved to
compel arbitration of the state claims. 141 The district court denied the
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977) (when there is fraud of institutional dimensions,
broad policy implications preclude mandatory arbitration).
134. Id. at 437.
135. 746 F.2d at 670.
136. Id. For cases applying the intertwining doctrine, see cases cited infra note 143.
137. 746 F.2d at 671.
138. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
139. See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (wherein the Supreme
Court held that because the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), preempted state
law voiding arbitration clauses, statutory state claims are arbitrable) and Sager v. District
Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985) (holding that in light of the Southland and Byrd decisions,
the non-waiver provision of the Colorado Securities Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(7)
(Supp. 1984), is void under the supremacy clause).
140. 105 S. Ct. at 1239.
141. Id. Since Dean Witter did not attempt to compel arbitration of the plaintiff's Rule
lOb-5 claim, the Supreme Court did not decide whether Rule lOb-5 claims were subject to
arbitration. Justice White indicated in his concurrence that Rule lOb-5 claims may be arbi-
trable. 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). A Colorado federal district court judge
recently allowed arbitration of a Rule lOb-5 claim based on the implicit suggestions in
Byrd. Brinton v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 85-Z-665, June 28, 1985.
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motion; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 142 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve whether the "intertwining" doctrine, applied by the
Ninth Circuit in Byrd, and by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in other
cases,' 4 3 could be utilized to deny arbitration. The Supreme Court held
that the Federal Arbitration Act 14 4 requires district courts to compel ar-
bitration of pendant arbitrable claims when one of the parties has filed a
motion to compel arbitration.' 4 5 The Court reasoned that the main
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act - to ensure judicial enforcement
of privately made agreements to arbitrate - would be frustrated if
courts utilized the "intertwining doctrine" to stay or deny arbitration. 1
46
The Court acknowledged that their decision might lead to concurrent
proceedings in judicial and arbitration fora, but emphasized that express
Congressional intent required courts to "rigorously enforce agreements
to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation."
' 14 7
The policy expressed in Byrd is clear. Pursuant to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, arbitration agreements will be enforced. The precise effect
Byrd will have upon the Tenth Circuit's decision in N. Donald Co., how-
ever, remains uncertain. In Byrd, Dean Witter assumed that the plain-
tiffs allegations under the federal securities statutes were not
arbitrable.1 48 For that reason, Dean Witter sought to compel arbitra-
tion only of state law claims. 14 9 Consequently, the Supreme Court, in
Byrd, declined to resolve whether the Federal Arbitration Act mandated
arbitration of claims arising under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.15 0 The
Court's analysis, if applied in N. Donald Co., would require arbitration of
state statutory and common law claims, but would not necessarily dis-
turb claims raised under the federal acts. Additionally, it is noteworthy
that the action in Byrd was brought against a broker-dealer by a private
investor rather than another broker-dealer. 15 1 Thus, the Supreme
Court did not directly address the Tenth Circuit's proposed distinction
between the investor/broker relationship and the broker/broker rela-
tionship. With regard to state law claims, the distinction appears implic-
itly to be dissolved. All such claims must be arbitrated. In the federal
area, however, the distinction's validity has not been questioned.
Most significantly, the Byrd Court directly confronted and abrogated
the "intertwining" doctrine. 15 2 Arbitration agreements must be en-
forced as to state law claims, irrespective of judicial economy or other
142. 105 S. Ct. at 1240.
143. See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981); Belke v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir. 1982).
144. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). The Act provides that written arbitration agreements
contained in contracts "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ...... 105 S. Ct. at
1241.
145. 105 S. Ct. at 1241.
146. Id. at 1241-42.
147. Id. at 1242-43.
148. Id. at 1239-40.
149. Id. at 1239.
150. Id. at 1240 n.l.
151. Id. at 1239.
152. Id. at 1240-41.
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considerations. 153 Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's ruling in A. Donald
Co., trial courts do not have the discretion to stay or deny a requested
arbitration where an agreement to arbitrate has been made.
1 5 4
Aichelle Johnson
153. Id.
154. Id.
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